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I. INTRODUCTION
Among the most difficult problems we currently face are unacceptably
high rates of violent crime in Indian country. A Bureau of Justice
Statistics study found recently that American Indians are victims of
violent crime at rates more than twice the national average — far
exceeding any other ethnic group in the country . . . . This is simply
unacceptable. Just like all Americans, Native Americans deserve to live
in safe communities.
United States Attorney General John Ashcroft2
Prior to the colonial establishments in North America, American Indians enjoyed
a sense of sovereignty, which is largely taken for granted by the citizens of the
United States today. Following the birth of the United States as a sovereign entity,
legislation and judicial decisions have essentially stripped Indian tribes of any
meaningful control over violent/felonious crimes committed in Indian country. With
a violent crime rate twice that of the United States’ national average, an overly
burdened federal prosecutor’s office, and an even larger possible crime rate increase
due to gaming in Indian country, now is the time to return “actual” criminal felony
jurisdiction to tribal courts.3
Imagine, if you will, terrorists from abroad walking and living among us, and
committing horrific crimes of violence, all without the fear of being punished,
because the United Nations would not recognize our authority to punish those who
were harming our citizens. Were the citizens of any city or state of this nation to
experience the same rate of crime and be forbidden to effectively punish those who
were committing the crimes, this author has no doubt that the citizens would revolt.
Allowing tribes the authority to effectively punish non-Indians would go a long way
in providing a safer environment in Indian country.
This article will trace the history of tribal criminal jurisdiction following the
arrival of the colonists, through the foundation of the United States government, and
will lead into where it stands today. On this journey, this article will discuss
significant statutes and case law dealing with the role tribal courts have played in
handling criminal jurisdiction in Indian country and will also discuss some important
studies conducted by the Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics and
others on the current state of violent crime in Indian country, as well as the tribes’
ability to handle it. Finally, this article will look to the future of tribal criminal
jurisdiction by looking at the changing view of the United States federal government.

2
United States Attorney General John Ashcroft, Remarks at the Native American Heritage
Event (Nov. 28, 2001), at http://www.usdoj.gov/otj/agremarksnativeamericanheritage.htm
(last visited Oct. 4, 2003) [hereinafter United States Attorney General John Ashcroft].
3

Technically, tribes do have jurisdiction over felony crimes; however, the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968 capped the punishments of crimes that tribal courts can dole out in Indian
country at a maximum of one year in jail, or less, and/or a maximum $5000 fine. See Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.
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II. BACKGROUND
Tribal legal systems, prior to the arrival of the colonists in America, varied from
tribe to tribe.4 That each tribe enjoyed a sense of sovereignty prior to the colonists’
arrival is not to be debated. As the colonists, and eventually the United States
federal government, claimed more and more territory, the sovereignty once enjoyed
by the tribes began to diminish. Chief Justice Marshall, in Johnson v. McIntosh5
recognized the sovereignty of the tribes, but recognized it as something less than
complete sovereignty and later relegated the tribes to the status of dependant
nations.6 This, and other rulings, placed tribal jurisdiction over any matter on the
chopping block, awaiting its determinative fate.
A. General Crimes Act and Ex Parte Crow Dog
One of the first areas of tribal sovereignty to get the axe was in the area of
criminal jurisdiction. In order to curtail problems with non-Indians and Indian
populations, the federal government, following the Revolutionary War, extended its
jurisdiction to non-Indians committing crimes against Indians, but allowed the tribes
to retain full jurisdiction over Indian against Indian crimes committed in Indian
country.7 This jurisdiction employed by the federal government was codified in 18
U.S.C. § 1152, and is known as the General Crimes, or Indian Country Crimes, Act.
Notably, the statute provides for the allowance of “exclusive jurisdiction” to the
tribes over Indians and non-Indians where a treaty had already given them that
option.8 The act reads:

Deleted: F

Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the
United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place
within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the
District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country.

4

FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1 § 6.B (1982).

5

21 U.S. 543, 574 (1823).

6

See also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
515 (1832).
7
18 U.S.C. § 1151 defines “Indian country” as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the term “Indian
country”, as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding
the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the
reservation, (b) all dependant Indian communities within the borders of the United
States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and
whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian
titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through
the same.
8

18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2003).
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This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against
the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing
any offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local law
of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive
jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes
respectively.9
The federal government quickly changed its mind regarding exclusive tribal
jurisdiction over Indian against Indian crimes as a reaction to the United States
Supreme Court decision in Ex Parte Crow Dog.10 Crow Dog was a member of the
Brule Sioux Band, who was convicted in federal court for murdering Spotted Tail,
another Brule Sioux Band member.11 Crow Dog petitioned the United States
Supreme Court under a writ of habeus corpus to be released from federal prison and
to have the murder conviction against him dropped.12 The defendant argued that the
federal government could not punish him because the murder occurred against
another Indian while in Indian country and therefore fell under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Tribe according to the General Crimes Act.13
Relying on statutes and treaties with the Sioux Indians, the federal government
argued that it had jurisdiction over “any person who commits murder” within the
territory of the United States, in spite of another revised statute which excluded
jurisdiction over Indian against Indian crimes committed in Indian country.14 The
treaty relied upon by the federal government stated in part that the Indians were to
“deliver up the wrong-doer”15 who commits “a wrong or depredation upon [a] person
or property of any one . . . .”16
The Supreme Court agreed but held that the treaty must be read in its entirety in
order to gain its full meaning.17 Where the preceding paragraph is also read, the
Court held that the only meaning that could be determined was that whites and tribes
were to hand over those wrong-doers who had committed crimes against the other
party, not amongst themselves.18 The charges and conviction against Crow Dog
were dismissed.19
9

Id. (emphasis added).

10

109 U.S. 556 (1883).

11

Id. at 557.

12

Id.

13

Id.

14

Id.

15

Id. at 563.

16

Id.

17

Id. at 567-68.

18

Id.

19

Id. at 572.
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Essentially, the General Crimes Act allowed the tribes exclusive jurisdiction over
Indian vs. Indian crimes of any nature, and gave concurrent jurisdiction to the tribes
over Indian vs. non-Indian crimes. But the holding of Crow Dog20 sent fear
throughout the United States Congress that Indians would literally, and actually, be
getting away with murder if things were to remain as they were.21 The result? The
Major Crimes Act.
B. The Major Crimes Act
18 U.S.C. § 1153, more commonly referred to as the Major Crimes Act, created
federal jurisdiction over a few specified crimes committed by an Indian against
another Indian or non-Indian. The Major Crimes Act reads:
(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian
or other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder,
manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under 109A, incest, assault
with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault
resulting in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title), an
assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years,
arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within
Indian country, shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other
persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States.
(b) Any offense referred to in subsection (a) of this section that is not defined
and punished by Federal law in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States shall be defined and punished in accordance with the laws of
the State in which such offense was committed as are in fore at the time of
such offense.22
Originally, the Major Crimes Act included only seven “major” crimes, but the list
has been expanded to fourteen.23 Crimes not listed in the Major Crimes Act remain
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribe, except in the case where jurisdiction has
been granted to the States under the infamous Public Law 280.24 Essentially, the
purpose behind the Major Crimes Act was to give the federal courts jurisdiction over
Indian criminals.

20

Id.

21

Some scholars suggest that much of the fear created was merely a manufactured hue and

cry.
22
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2003) (emphasis added). Originally, the Major Crimes Act also
covered the misdemeanor (usually) crime of theft, but eliminated the confusion in a 1984
amendment, which replaced the crime of “theft” with “felony theft.” WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR.,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 161 (1998).
23

WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 153 (1998).

24

67 Stat. 588 (1953).
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It is possible, however, that a tribe could exercise criminal jurisdiction over the
“Major” crimes,25 but the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 essentially strips the tribal
judicial decision of any effectiveness.26 In addition, tribal authorities have been
highly critical of the quality of prosecution by the U.S. Attorney’s office under the
Major Crimes Act and have often attempted to assert jurisdiction on their own.27
Such an example can be found in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe.28
C. Oliphant v. Suquamish
In 1973, fed up with the lack of law enforcement against non-Indians on its
reservation, the Suquamish Tribe of the Port Madison Reservation in the State of
Washington passed new tribal law and order codes and posted signs at the entrance
to the reservation warning all visitors that entrance would subject them to the
jurisdiction and laws of the Tribe, whether Indian or non-Indian.29 A few years later,
tribal authorities arrested—for separate incidents—two non-Indians, Mark Oliphant
and Daniel Belgarde, who were living on the reservation.30 Oliphant was arrested for
assaulting a Tribal officer and Belgarde was arrested for evading Tribal authorities
on a high-speed chase, which ended when Belgarde crashed into a Tribal police
vehicle.31 In compliance with the Tribal codes, both were arraigned before the tribal
court.32 The defendants then sought relief in United States District Court under a
writ of habeus corpus, claiming that the Tribe had no criminal jurisdiction over
them.33
The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington denied
the defendants their relief and held that the defendants were subject to the criminal
jurisdiction of the Tribe.34 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s findings.35
Absent an affirmative grant of power from the United States Congress, the
United States Supreme Court held that tribes did not have criminal jurisdiction over

25
See Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that where a tribe is in
compliance with the rights defined under ICRA, the Tribe has the authority to try tribal
members for crimes which also fall under the Major Crimes Act).
26

See supra note 3.

27

CANBY, supra note 23, at 158.

28

435 U.S. 191 (1978).

29

Id. at 194.

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Id. at 195.

35

Id.
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non-Indians; the Court reversed both the Ninth Circuit and district court’s findings.36
The Court based its holding on the age old claim that the powers were inconsistent
with Indian status as dependant sovereigns.37 In dicta, the court reasoned that even
though tribes, and more specifically, tribal courts, are more advanced than they once
were, (not to mention the Constitutional liberty protections afforded in the Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968) it must be obvious to everyone that tribes were incapable
of exercising criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.38 Why were the tribes
incapable? Because when the tribes “submitted” themselves to the sovereignty of
the United States, they “gave up their power to try non-Indian citizens of the US
except in a manner acceptable to Congress.”39 Whether a person agrees or disagrees
with the reasoning of the Court, the potential “fix” for the tribes would now seem to
be in the hands of Congress.
Barely two weeks after the holding in Oliphant,40 the U.S. Supreme Court created
future controversy by upholding a tribe’s criminal jurisdiction over the tribe’s own
members. While dealing ultimately with the double jeopardy issue, United States v.
Wheeler41 has had determinative implications on the issue of whether or not tribes
have criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians.
D. United States v. Wheeler
The defendant was a member of the Navajo Tribe who had been convicted in
Tribal Court and punished under the laws of the Tribe for contributing to the
delinquency of a minor and for disorderly conduct.42 He was then subsequently
convicted and sentenced under federal law for the crime of statutory rape.43
The defendant argued that double jeopardy barred his subsequent sentence in
federal court.44 The “Dual Sovereignty Doctrine” establishes that no double jeopardy
attaches where there are two governmental sources that derive their jurisdiction from
two separate sources. For example, state sovereignty is inherent, and federal
sovereignty stems from the U.S. Constitution, therefore, there is no double jeopardy
issue when prosecuted by the federal government and the State.
The question in this case was whether the federal plenary power over tribes really
makes tribes creatures of the federal government.45 The Supreme Court held that the
36

Id. at 208.

37

Id. at 210.

38

Id.

39

Id.

40

435 U.S. 191 (1978).

41

435 U.S. 313 (1978).

42

Id. at 315.

43

Id. at 315-16.

44

Id. at 330.

45

Id. at 322.
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Tribe’s sovereignty was not created by Congress, but existed independently (as far as
criminal jurisdiction is concerned) as a separate sovereign. Therefore, the federal
government was not placing the defendant in double jeopardy.46
What most people focus on in the Wheeler decision, however, is the Court’s
insistence and constant referral to a tribe’s right of jurisdiction over its “members.”47
Some argue that the Court, in its constant referral to jurisdiction over tribal
“members,” was implying that tribes may not have jurisdiction over Indian, nontribal members. Several years later the Court decided to follow through with its
implied threat in Wheeler;48 the Court removed criminal jurisdiction from the tribes
over Indian non-Tribal members in Duro v. Reina.49
E. Duro v. Reina and the “Duro Fix”
The Pima Maricopa Indian Tribe attempted to assert Tribal criminal jurisdiction
over Albert Duro for a murder which took place on the Pima Maricopa Indian
Reservation after the United States Attorney dropped the charges against him in
federal court.50 Though Indian, Duro was not a member of the Pima Maricopa
Tribe.51 Duro had been living on the Pima Maricopa Reservation with his girlfriend
and also worked for the tribally owned PiCopa Construction Company.52 The
victim, a 14 year old boy, was also not a member of the Pima Maricopa Tribe.53
Additionally, because the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 only allowed the tribe to
fix punishments at less than one year, the Tribal criminal code involved only
misdemeanor-type crimes; therefore, Duro was merely charged with illegally firing a
weapon on the reservation.54
After reaffirming its previous holding in Wheeler (that a tribe has exclusive
criminal jurisdiction over its own members),55 the Supreme Court turned to the issue
46

Id.

47

“The sovereign power of a tribe to prosecute its members for tribal offenses clearly does
not fall within that part of sovereignty which the Indians implicitly lost by virtue of their
dependent status.” Id. at 326. “That the Navajo Tribe’s power to punish offenses against
tribal law committed by its members is an aspect of its retained sovereignty is further
supported by the absence of any federal grant of such power.” Id. at 326-27. “The power to
punish offenses against tribal law committed by tribe members, which was part of the
Navajos’ primeval sovereignty, has never been taken away from them . . . .” Id. at 328.
(emphasis added).
48

435 U.S. 313 (1978).

49

495 U.S. 676 (1990).

50

Id. at 679-80.

51

Id. at 679.

52

Id.

53

Id.

54

Id. at 681.

55

Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313.
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of “whether the sovereignty retained by the tribes in their dependent status within our
scheme of government includes the power of criminal jurisdiction over
nonmembers.”56
In overruling the district court, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found
that because Congress made no attempt to limit tribal criminal jurisdiction to
members of the tribe, and because the majority of statutes dealing with tribal
criminal jurisdiction mentioned only the authority of the tribe over Indians, a tribe
did indeed have jurisdiction over all Indians, tribal members or not.57
Referring back to its holdings in Wheeler58 and Oliphant,59 and once again citing
to the dependent sovereign status of the tribes, the Supreme Court found that what
actual sovereign authority remained in the tribes was only that which was necessary
to deal with internal relations. Subsequently, the Court held that tribes have no
criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians.60 (Although this author would argue
that murder on your reservation would seem to be important “internal relations.”)61
The court reasoned that because criminal penalties are so “serious an intrusion on
personal liberty,”62 criminal jurisdiction over non-Tribal persons, whether Indian or
non-Indian, was one of those powers “necessarily surrendered by the tribes in their
submission to the overriding sovereignty of the United States.”63 The Court further
explained that non-members often have no say in tribal government or elections, and
it would be unfair to hold non-members to a standard to which they have no say.64
However, the Court did not explain why foreign nationals, who commit crimes in the
United States, and who have no say in U.S. government or elections, are still subject
to the criminal jurisdiction of the federal or state governments.
In Duro,65 the Tribe and the federal government argued that a jurisdictional void
would be created where tribes would have no power to punish non-member Indians
for any minor violation and where states were unwilling to do so.66 Unfortunately,
this argument fell on the deaf ears of the Court.

56

Duro, 495 U.S. at 684.

57

Id. at 683.

58

Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 313.

59

Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191.

60

Duro, 495 U.S. at 686.

61

It is difficult for this author to understand how Congress can allow the states to prosecute
citizens of other states for crimes committed in their respective states, but not allow the tribes
the same protection.
62

Duro, 495 U.S. at 693.

63

Id.

64

Id. at 688.

65

Duro, 495 U.S. 676.

66

Id. at 696.
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To its credit, Congress, in 1990, attempted to fix the ruling in Duro67 by adding
language to 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), which defined “powers of self-government” of the
tribes to include “exercis[ing] criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.”68 This
amendment has come to be known as the “Duro Fix.”
This language, depending on which circuit you agree with, the Eighth or the
Ninth, either affirmatively recognized the inherent sovereignty of the tribes, or
delegated the authority to the tribes, over non-member Indians. What difference
does it make? If the authority is inherent, there are no double jeopardy issues. If the
authority is delegated, then double jeopardy exists and tribes would effectively be
barred from prosecuting non-members for crimes committed within the reservation.
III. THREE ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND STATUTES
In looking at the broad picture of Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction, it is also necessary
to look at three additional background statutes. Public Law 280 deals with
statutorily granted jurisdiction to some states.69 The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968
deals with codified individual liberties which were given to Native Americans.70 The
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act deals with the regulation and oversight of gaming
within Indian country.71
A. Public Law 280
When looking at whether or not more effective criminal/felony jurisdiction
should be given to the tribes, it is important to look at the often confusing Public
Law 280.72 Public Law 280, or PL-280, transfers criminal jurisdiction to the state
governments of certain “Mandatory States” and other “Optional States,” sometimes
concurrently with the tribes, but usually exclusive of the federal government.73 The
“Mandatory States” are: Alaska, California; Minnesota (except the Red Lake
reservation); Nebraska; Oregon (except the Warm Springs reservation); and
Wisconsin.74 These “Mandatory States” have been given criminal jurisdiction over
misdemeanors and felonies committed in Indian country within the borders of the
67

Duro, 495 U.S. 676.

68

25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2003).

69

Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588.

70

The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1302, 1303, 1311, 1312, 1321,
1322, 1323, 1324, 1325, 1326, 1331, 1341 (2004).
71
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701, 2702, 2703, 2704, 2705, 2706,
2707, 2708, 2709, 2710, 27111, 2712, 2713, 2714, 2715, 2716, 27117, 2717(a), 2718, 2719,
2720, 2721 (2004).
72

Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588.

73

COHEN, supra note 4, at 5.

74

Indian Country Criminal Jurisdiction, PL-280 and Other Jurisdictional Transfers,
available at http://tribaljurisdiction.tripod.com/indiancountrycriminaljurisdiction/id4.html.
(last visited Oct. 4, 2003).
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state.75 The so-called “Optional States” were given the option of having criminal
jurisdiction over Indian country over certain types of offenses established under state
law, while the tribe retains jurisdiction over misdemeanors and the federal
government still retains jurisdiction under the Major and General Crimes Acts.76 The
U.S. Department of Justice has made an excellent chart to help further explain how
criminal jurisdiction works in PL-280 states:77

75

Id.

76

Id.

77

U.S. Dept. of Justice, Criminal Resource Manual, 689 Jurisdictional Summary, available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00689.htm (last
visited Oct. 4, 2003).
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Offender

Victim

Jurisdiction

Non-Indian

Non-Indian

State jurisdiction is exclusive of federal
and tribal jurisdiction.

Non-Indian

Indian

“Mandatory” state has jurisdiction
exclusive of federal and tribal jurisdiction.
“Option” state and federal government
have jurisdiction. There is no tribal
jurisdiction.

Indian

Non-Indian

“Mandatory” state has jurisdiction
exclusive of federal government but not
necessarily of the tribe. “Option” state has
concurrent jurisdiction with the federal
courts.

Indian

Indian

“Mandatory” state has jurisdiction
exclusive of federal government but not
necessarily of the tribe. “Option” state has
concurrent jurisdiction with tribal courts
for all offenses, and concurrent jurisdiction
with the federal courts for those listed in
18 U.S.C. § 1153.

Non-Indian

Victimless

State jurisdiction is exclusive, although
federal jurisdiction may attach in an option
state if impact on individual Indian or
tribal interest is clear.

Indian

Victimless

There may be concurrent state, tribal, and
in an option state, federal jurisdiction.
There is no state regulatory jurisdiction.

Which category a defendant falls into and whether or not the Tribal court is in a
state which has been given PL-280 jurisdiction, can often be confusing issues.
Under the issue of granting more effective criminal jurisdiction back to the tribes,
however, PL-280 states would still retain jurisdiction over criminal matters which
fall with in their state’s boundaries.
B. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968
Additionally, while the tribes may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the major
crimes committed by Indians in Indian country, their ability to adequately punish
those acts was severely curtailed by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,78 which
78

The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1301.
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only allows for tribes to apply a maximum punishment of one year in jail and a
$5,000 maximum fine.79
Conceived by Congress following a ruling by the United States Supreme Court in
Talton v. Mayes,80 which held that the rights guaranteed by the United States
Constitution did not apply to the tribes,81 the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968
codified a limited amount of Constitutional liberties which it felt should also apply to
the tribes.82 Similar to the Bill of Rights, the Indian Civil Rights Act defined certain
liberties which applied to all Native Americans. It is also applicable against tribal
governments. These same liberties, would apply to defendants who are subject to the
criminal jurisdiction of the tribes. Therefore, whatever fears a non-Indian might
have about being denied Constitutional protections in Tribal court could be answered
under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.
C. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
One last statutory area which touches on crime in Indian country is the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act.83 While not a statute that grants criminal jurisdiction over
gaming in Indian country to the tribes, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act was
created by Congress to provide regulation of the fast growing gaming, which was
taking place in certain areas of Indian country, and to help prevent and/or “shield”
the tribes “from organized crime and other corrupting influences.”84
Before any tribe may conduct certain types of gaming, certain provisions of the
Act must be complied with, and (in some cases) the tribe must receive the approval
of the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC)—the administrative agency
established by Congress to watch over Indian gaming. It is interesting to note that
although the purpose of the Act was to promote tribal welfare and to protect tribes
from the influence of organized crime, the statute has no enforcement provisions.
The Chairman of the NIGC must rely on the overburdened U.S. Attorney’s office to
combat any violations of its provisions. There is simply no expressed provision
which would further protect the tribe from any organized crime, especially where
that organized crime comes from non-Indians.

79
Note, however, that the Act does not impose limits on probation periods or community
service.
80

163 U.S. 376 (1896).

81

Id. at 384.

82

COHEN, supra note 4, at § 12.E.; see also Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302 (including freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom from self incrimination,
etc.).
83

The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701.

84

Id. at § 2702(2).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005

13

426

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:413

IV. CRIME IN INDIAN COUNTRY AND THOSE WHO ARE UNABLE TO DEAL WITH IT
With an overall background of the state of criminal jurisdiction within Indian
country, it is now possible to look at how this jurisdictional void has had such a
hugely negative impact on Native Americans. Although courts and Congress have
not expressly created this void, implicitly it exists and is doing terrible damage. Let
the U.S. Attorney’s do their job, you say? This article is not attempting to imply that
they are not doing their job, but as the statistics (compiled by the Department of
Justice) point out, the U.S. Attorney’s office has priorities which do not seem to fall
in the direction of crime in Indian country.
A. American Indians and Crime
In February 1999, the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics released a study entitled American Indians and Crime. The study paints a
very disturbing picture of criminal activity among Native Americans. The study
found that American Indians are twice as likely as any other ethnic group in the
United States to experience violent crimes.85 American Indians during the study
years of 1992-96 experienced a violent crime rate of 124 per 1,000 persons aged 12
or older, as compared to 49 per 1,000 for whites, and 61 per 1,000 for blacks.86
Average annual number of violent victimizations per 1,000 persons age 12
or older, 1992-96:87

150
100
50
0
All Violent
Crimes

Rape/Sexual
Assault

Robbery

Aggrevated
Assault

Assault

American Indians
All races

American Indians, as of 1998, accounted for 1% of the total United States
population, or approximately 2.3 million people.88 Whites accounted for 82.6%, or

85
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, American Indians and Crime 2,
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/aic/pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2004).
86

Id. at 3.

87

Id. at 1.

88

Id.
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222 million.89 Blacks accounted for 12.7%, or 34.3 million,90 and Asians accounted
for 3.8%, or 10.3 million.91
Other than for murder,92 Indians experienced higher than average rates of
victimization for the categories of rape/sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault,
and simple assault.93 When asked about who had committed the acts of violence
against the victim, American Indians reported that nearly 46% of the offenses were
committed by strangers.94 Additionally, nearly 70% of the victims of violent crimes
among American Indians described the offender as non-Indian.95
Percent of violent victimizations, by race of victim and race of offender,
1992-96.96
Race of Offender
Race of Victim
Total
Other
White
Black
All Races

100%

11%

60%

29%

American Indians

100

29

60

10

White
Black
Asian

100
100
100

11
7
32

69
12
39

20
81
29

Clearly, the percentages of those who are non-Indian offenders of Indian victims
is staggering. While the tribe may be able to punish those who commit these
offenses where they are Indian, nearly 70% cannot be punished by the tribe at all,
and it is worrisome to guess the number of those 70% who go unpunished due to the
federal government’s inability or lack of desire to do so.
Certainly, the United States Attorney General’s office would prosecute those
more serious crimes, such as murder. However, the offenses committed in Indian

89

Id.

90

Id.

91

Id.

92

American Indians experienced 150 murders, per 100,000 people, which is close the per
capita rate for the entire nation.
93

U.S. Dept. of Justice, supra note 85, at 1.

94

Id. at 6.

95
Id. at 7 (“The majority (60%) of American Indian victims of violent crime described the
offender as white, and nearly 30% of the offenders were likely to have been other American
Indians. An estimated 10% of offenders were described as black.”).
96

Id. at 7.
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country may not fall high enough on their priority list at the time they are reported,
and may, in fact, go unpunished.
Comparison of Violent and Drug Offenses*
Total U.S. Offenses:

117, 450

Violent Offenses:

5,641

4.8% (of Total)

Prosecuted:
Declined:
Drug Offenses:
Prosecuted:
Declined:

3,732
1,909
37,009
26,917
6,126

60% (of violent)
30% (of violent)
32% (of Total)
78% (of Drug)
16% (of Drug)

* Data and Percentages taken from the U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, 2000.
For example (see chart above), for the statistical year of October 1999 to
September 2000, the Attorney General’s office investigated 117,450 total federal
offenses nationwide.97 Of those, 5,641 (or 4.8%) were considered “violent offenses,”
which are categorized as murder, assault, robbery, sexual abuse, kidnapping, and
threats against the President.98 Of the 5,641 “violent offenses,” 60% were
prosecuted, and 30% of the cases were declined.99 Only 4,250 of the total number of
“violent offenders” were arrested.100 Of the 3,732 offenders actually prosecuted,
only 2,676 were convicted.101 Compare this with the number of federal drug offenses
investigated, and we see that of the 117,450 total offenses investigated, 37,009 (or
32%) were drug related.102 Of those 37,009, roughly 80% were prosecuted, and only
roughly 20% were declined.103 Obviously the Attorney General’s office has certain
priorities set up when looking at which offenses to prosecute. Unfortunately for
American Indians, their offenses fall more under the “violent offenses” category for
which very little priority is given.104
97
U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Compendium of Federal Justice
Statistics, 2000, at http://www.ojp.udoj.gov/bjs/abstract/cfjs00.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2003)
[hereinafter Compendium].
98

Id.

99

Id.

100

Id. at 9.

101

Id.

102

Id.

103

Id. at 29.

104

For example, during the same time period as the U.S. Department of Justice
Compendium, 9,578 cases of “violent offenses” were reported just in Indian country alone, but
only 5,641 “violent offenses” were looked into by the Attorney General’s office nationwide.
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B. Crime Due to Gaming
These “violent crime” rates could be expected to grow even larger with the influx
of money and persons to Indian country due to gambling. While many gambling
towns, such as Atlantic City, do not appear to experience a rise in crime rates when
tourists are kept out of the equation, many researchers agree that with a large influx
of people, crime rates are going to rise.105 Whether this is attributed to the gambling
or to the larger number of people going to Indian country does not need to be
debated in this paper.
Whatever the cause, crime rates are likely to increase. In a question and answer
interview with one-year incumbent police chief Gary Jeandron, of the Palm Springs,
California Police Department, the Desert Sun newspaper asked Chief Jeandron
whether Indian gaming in California had increased the rate of crime in the area.106
His answer: “A successful business that brings in a large amount of population and
influences the demographics, you are going to have increased crime . . . . [I]f you
have an increased amount of people coming in, you are going to have more
crime.”107 With the tribes being able to punish only the worst of these offenders with
one year in jail or a $5,000 fine, and in the cases of non-Indians, not at all, these
offenders can run rampant in Indian country with little to no fear of punishment.
Again, this article is not attempting to argue the evils of gambling itself, but is
merely trying to show that sources indicate that where there is a large increase in
population, whether as new move-ins or tourists, the crime rate is likely to increase
as well. Also, the probability is high that a large portion of those coming to Indian
country to gamble will be non-Indian. While the non-Indian victims will see
restitution of their injuries due to the fact that the federal government and states have
criminal jurisdiction over them, it is not as likely that the Indian victims will see the
same result.
But even if tribes had the jurisdiction necessary to combat crime due to gaming
or otherwise, do tribes have the law enforcement and judicial resources to effectively
deal with it? There would be no need to make criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
in Indian country exclusive to the tribes. But what law enforcement and judicial
resources currently exist?
C. Policing on American Indian Reservations
In another report by the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, entitled Tribal Law Enforcement, 2000, the Justice Department determined
See U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Tribal Law Enforcement, 2000, 3,
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/tle00.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2003).
105
Gambling and Crime, Crime Rates, at http://www.casinochecker.com/casino_
knowledge/crime/rates.htm (last visited June 7, 2004).
106
Cindy Uken, Desert Sun Quizzes Palm Springs Police Chief, THE DESERT SUN (June 1,
2003), at http://www.thedesertsun.com/news/stories2003/opinion/20030531174753.shtml (last
visited June 7, 2004).
107

Id.
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that out of 562 federally recognized tribal entities, only 171 tribes had law
enforcement agencies with at least one or more officers.108 An additional 37 tribes
receive law enforcement through the Bureau of Indian Affairs.109
As the reservation policy was implemented, policing on the reservation consisted
entirely of policing by United States soldiers,110 who obviously did not have the
interests of the tribal members in mind. In the 1860’s, American Indians were
allowed to join the ranks of the tribal police forces, although they were often looked
down upon by other tribal members as agents of the federal government.111 This type
of control, a few tribal members working with, but mostly being supervised by, the
federal government lasted for close to the next eighty to ninety years until the
1950’s, 60’s, and 70’s.112 However, some tribes, due to neglect from the federal
government, and due to an issue of sovereignty, had their own tribal police forces as
well.
During the 1960’s and 70’s the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) created and
managed the “first modernized reservation police forces,”113 as well as established
the BIA Law Enforcement Academy.114 It was also during this time that the era of
“self determination” began to evolve among the tribes, and more and more tribes
began establishing, and in some cases re-establishing, stronger tribal governments
and courts.115
In the National Institute of Justice report entitled Policing on American Indian
Reservations, the authors create a rough estimate of the makeup of a typical Indian
country police department. On the average, the typical police department is either
managed directly by the BIA, or indirectly through contract where the BIA merely
provides the funding but is administered and employed by the tribe.116 The average
police department polices 500,000 acres of land (roughly the size of Delaware) with
a total of 16 police officers (only a slight majority are Indian), all of whom would
obviously not be on duty at the same time.117 Those 16 or fewer police officers
would be responsible for 10,000 tribal members (which of course does not include
any non-tribal members living there), while serving in dilapidated police buildings
108

U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Tribal Law Enforcement, 2000, at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/tle00.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2003).
109

Id.

110

STEWART WAKELING ET AL., NATIONAL INSTITUTE
POLICING ON AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS 41 (2001).
111

Id.

112

Id. at 42.

113

Id.

114

Id.

115

Id.

116

Id. at 7, 9.

117

Id. at 9.
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and driving very worn out police vehicles, all of which would operate on a budget of
$1 million or less.118
Today, only a small percentage of tribes have law enforcement agencies or their
own tribal judiciary, and a few are still controlled by the BIA.119 But, as was
mentioned above, criminal jurisdiction need not be exclusive to the tribe. Criminal
jurisdiction could be held concurrently with the federal government or even the state,
which could prosecute those cases where adequate tribal courts, jails or law
enforcement is not found. But where a tribe does have sufficient resources and
desire, the tribe should be allowed to conduct full criminal jurisdiction and
punishment. A current example can be found in the State of Oklahoma with the
Cherokee Nation. The Cherokee Nation and Oklahoma have teamed their law
enforcement resources so that some law enforcement officers from the state and
those of the tribe are cross-deputized to deal with any matters which may occur when
the other is not around or lacks the resources to adequately deal with it.
The same process is often done with prison systems. Another example from the
State of Oklahoma is the Creek Juvenile Detention Center which shares juvenile
bedding with the state. But, there are tribes which have the resources to adequately
adjudicate and incarcerate criminals. The next section briefly explains the status of
courts and prisons in Indian country.
D. Tribal Courts and Prisons in Indian Country
Historically, many tribes had ways of dealing with problems created within the
tribe, whether it was disputes between or among families. If the problem was serious
enough, the offender was often banished from the tribe. Tribes began to have a more
formal/Americanized look to their judicial systems in the early 1900’s. Due to the
fear and lack of understanding of how offenders were punished among the tribes,
Congress created the Courts of Indian Offenses (more specifically in response to the
holding in Crow Dog120).121 The Courts of Indian Offenses took over the traditional
role of the tribes in settling disputes among its members and had no jurisdiction over
non-Indians.122

118

Id.

119

In 1995, the BIA created a survey which showed that of a total of 178 total tribal law
enforcement agencies, 88 had agencies created through a contract with the BIA, 64 were
administered completely by the BIA, 22 were completely administered by the tribe, but funded
through a block grant from the BIA, and 4 tribes administered and funded their own law
enforcement agencies. Id. at 7.
120

109 U.S. 556 (1883); see supra Part I.A.

121

B.J. Jones, Role of Indian Tribal Courts in the Justice System, UNIVERSITY OF
OKLAHOMA HEALTH SCIENCES CENTER 2 (Mar. 2000), at http://w3.ouhsc.edu/ccan/
Tribal%20Courts.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2003).
122

Id. at 4.
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With the nodding approval of Congress, many tribes instituted, or re-instituted,
more formalized judicial systems beginning in the early 1930’s.123 Early on, those
tribes which operated their own judicial systems had judges and attorneys who were
often untrained in the law, but more recently this is becoming less frequent.124 Many
judges and attorneys now have law degrees.125 But some of the untrained judges and
attorneys still remain.
Today, courts in Indian country are a mix of tribal courts and courts administered
by the BIA.126 As stated above, not every tribe has the resources or perhaps even the
desire to have its own judicial systems, and unfortunately, this author was unable to
locate any statistical information regarding the exact number of tribal judicial
systems now operating. The Department of Justice, however, is currently conducting
a survey to determine this information entitled, 2002 Census of Tribal Justice
Agencies in American Indian and Alaska Native Tribal Jurisdictions, but has not yet
published this information on its website.
Thankfully, the Department of Justice has conducted a survey of jails in Indian
country, appropriately entitled, Jails in Indian Country, 2001.127 As of 2001, the
Department of Justice has determined that a total of 68 correctional facilities exist,128
in one form or another, within Indian country, where a total of 2,030 persons were
awaiting trial or serving sentences.129 Of those in custody, 1600 were adults, and 312
were juveniles.130 The total capacity of the 68 correctional facilities in Indian
country was 2,101 and were at 91% of capacity as of 2001, but were at 125% of
capacity during the peak summer months.131 Of the 2,030 persons being held in
correctional facilities in Indian country, misdemeanor charges accounted for 1,738 of
the inmates, while felony charges accounted for 113.132 The disparity is not illogical
when one remembers that tribal courts can only impose a maximum sentence of one
year and/or a $5,000 fine. It would not make much sense for a tribe to charge too
many persons with felonies that could only be punished for such a short amount of
123

Id. at 5.

124

Id.

125

Id.

126

Id.

127

U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Jails in Indian
Country, 2001 (May 2002) at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pubalp2.htm#jic (last visited Oct.
4, 2003).
128
The 10 largest facilities held more than 60% of the total number of inmates in Indian
country correctional facilities, with 7 of the 10 facilities being located in the State of Arizona.
See id. at 3.
129

Id. at 1.

130

Id.

131

Id.

132

Id. at 2.
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time, probation time notwithstanding. But whether tribes have the resources or not,
it is refreshing to note the seemingly 180 degree change in how Congress is currently
viewing its criminal jurisdictional role in Indian country.
V. CHANGING FEDERAL/STATE VIEW/ROLE IN INDIAN COUNTRY
Ironic, and somewhat surprising, is the changing federal congressional view/role
in Indian country. Long the bane of the tribes’ desire for increasing tribal
sovereignty, Congress is now pushing for a larger role for the tribes in combating
crime in Indian country. And once a defender of what little was acknowledged of
tribal sovereignty, the courts are now waging a war to remove effective jurisdiction
over Indian non-Tribal criminals. This section looks briefly at a few federal
initiatives which have been aimed at decreasing tribal dependence on federal
assistance as well as a strong push by Senator Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii) to raise
tribal sovereignty to that enjoyed by the states. Additionally, this section will briefly
discuss the U.S. Supreme Court case of United States v. Lara133 from the Eighth
Circuit, with the Eighth Circuit originally holding that tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians was a delegated power from Congress134 and therefore implicitly
removes Tribal jurisdiction over non-member Indians.
Also recognizing the increasing violent crime rate among American Indians, the
United States Department of Justice created the Indian Country Justice Initiative
(ICJI) in order to “streamline the Justice Department’s support for Indian
Country.”135 The initiative instituted several pilot programs with the hope of
instructing and strengthening the tribal members to handle problems by employing
traditional and modern mechanisms.136 Additionally, the Department of Justice is
working in conjunction with the Department of Interior on the CIRCLE Project.
A. The CIRCLE Project
The CIRCLE project, or Comprehensive Indian Resources for Community and
Law Enforcement project, is a three year project that was created by the Department
of Justice to help curb the rising violent crime rate in Indian country by teaming up
with the local Indian communities.137 Rather than create a new program which
would require federal funding, the CIRCLE project utilizes the existing resources of
the Department of Justice and the tribes.138 The central focus of the project is in
developing creative and effective solutions from the tribes themselves, which make

133

324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2003).

134

Id. at 640.

135

Kim Baca, The Changing Federal Role in Indian Country, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE JOURNAL 9 (Apr. 2001), at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/jr000247c.pdf (last visited
Oct. 4, 2003).
136

Id.

137

United States Attorney General John Ashcroft, supra note 2.

138

Id.
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recommendations to the federal government on ways to handle certain problems on
the reservation.139
One of the first tribes to receive assistance from the project was the Northern
Cheyenne tribe located near Billings, Montana.140 The tribe applied for the project
due to the rising increase in juvenile crime because of methamphetamine, as well as
an overall increase in violent activity on the reservation.141 Initial reports from the
tribe showed that juvenile criminal activity declined by more than half following the
implementation of the project.142 The Oglala Sioux tribe of South Dakota, also a
participant in the project, noted a decrease in gang activity and domestic violence.143
These tribes were not financially well off, but were willing to do whatever necessary
to bring order back to the tribes. Additionally, on a side note, the CIRCLE project
tribes went above and beyond the project following the tragic events of September
11, 2001 when they jumped in their vehicles and drove across country to aid in the
search and rescue efforts as well as in the recovery of the citizens and city of New
York.144
One of the highlights of the CIRCLE project is that so much was done to improve
the situations of these two tribes without any additional funding from the federal
government. Some might argue that if tribes regain their full sovereign status or
merely achieve the sovereignty enjoyed by the states, that the federal government
should remove all financial assistance from the tribes. And while some tribes are
financially better off than many states (due to gaming), many tribes would
effectively disappear if financial assistance were removed. However, states enjoy an
elevated sovereign status above and beyond that of the tribes and still receive federal
financial assistance; therefore, an argument for improving the sovereign status in line
with that of the States would seem to be fair. This is exactly what Senator Inouye is
attempting to do with his proposed amendments to the Homeland Security Act of
2002; He is arguing that tribes should be as sovereign as any state.145
B. Tribal Government Amendments to the Homeland Security Act of 2002
Senator Inouye has introduced an amendment to the Homeland Security Act of
2002146 which would recognize tribal sovereign powers over non-Indians. In the
Tribal Government Amendments to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Senator

139

Baca, supra note 135, at 10.

140

Id.

141

Id.

142

United States Attorney General John Ashcroft, supra note 2.

143

Baca, supra note 135, at 10.

144

United States Attorney General John Ashcroft, supra note 2.

145

Inouye Ties Sovereignty to Homeland Security, INDIANZ.COM (Feb. 25, 2003), at
http://www.indianz.com/News/show.asp?ID=2003/02/25/inouye (last visited Oct. 4, 2003).
146

Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
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Inouye, along with Senator Daniel Akaka (HI), Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell
(CO), and Senator Maria Cantwell (WA) co-sponsored this bill with the goal “to
overturn recent Supreme Court rulings by recognizing that tribes have primary law
enforcement duties on their lands.”147 In addressing the National Congress of
American Indians in Washington, D.C., Senator Inouye said,
Homeland security presents an opportunity . . . to secure a status under
federal law that will not only recognize your powers and responsibilities
as sovereign governments but will strengthen your position and your
status in the family of governments that make up the United States . . . .
Least of all, you should be as sovereign as any state in the union.148
The “Findings and Purposes” section of the proposed amendment suggests that
Congress find that each Indian tribal government possesses the inherent sovereign
authority:
(A) (i) to establish its own form of government;
(ii) to adopt a constitution or other organic governing documents; and
(iii) to establish a tribal judicial system; and
(B) to provide for the health and safety of those who reside on tribal lands,
including the provision of law enforcement services on lands under the
jurisdiction of the tribal government . . . .149
The purpose of this Act is to ensure the inclusion of the Indian tribes in discussions
involving homeland security as well as to make sure the tribes participate “fully in
the protection of the homeland of the United States.”150 If approved, Congress will
have come a long way from its earlier days of stripping the tribes of nearly
everything they were and owned to a period where it is now making a more sincere
effort to support the tribes in their increased sovereignty during a period of selfdetermination. This amendment is still pending.
If Senator Inouye and others get their wish, tribes would not only regain criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes within Indian country, but the
wording of the amendment also seems to imply that tribes would have jurisdiction
over foreign nationals as well. If that is not its intention, then including it as part of
the Homeland Security Act would not make any sense. In order for the tribes to aid
the United States in the defense of the “homeland,” it would be necessary for them to
have full criminal jurisdiction over all persons committing crimes within Indian
country. The United States Supreme Court seemed poised to strike another blow to
tribal criminal jurisdiction by implicitly removing tribal criminal jurisdiction over
non-member Indians.
147

Id.

148

Id.

149

Tribal Government Amendments to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, S. 578, 108th
Cong. § 2 (2003).
150

Senate Bill 578.
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C. United States v. Lara and United States v. Enas
The courts, once friendly towards Indian sovereignty, even if on a lowered status,
however, appear to be the ones who are now taking large swipes at what little is left
of Indian criminal jurisdiction. Recently, in United States v. Lara,151 the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit suggested that the ultimate arbiter of what sovereign
powers the tribes have should be held in the United States Supreme Court and not
Congress—where those powers are not dealing with areas which would fall under
the Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution.152
The Ninth Circuit, however, in United States v. Enas153 held that decisions made
by Congress, such as the “Duro Fix” legislation, were a legitimate exercise of
Congressional authority. The Supreme Court took up the argument on an appeal of
the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Lara.154
Both cases dealt with the double jeopardy issue and whether or not a tribe or the
federal government could prosecute the defendants when either of the other had
already done so. The argument stems back to the one posed by the holdings in
Wheeler155 and Duro,156 namely, do tribes have jurisdiction over non-member
Indians, and if so whether or not the tribes were acting under inherent power or
delegated powers because of the “Duro Fix”?
1. United States v. Enas
Enas, a member of the San Carlos Apache Tribe, while on the White Mountain
Apache Reservation was arrested and charged with “assault with a deadly weapon,
and assault with intent to cause serious bodily injury”157 to Joseph Kessay.158 Enas
pled guilty to the charges but later fled while on work release.159 While on the lam, a
federal grand jury filed charges against Enas in Federal District Court, which
dismissed the grand jury indictment on the basis that the Tribe was not a separate
sovereign from the United States, and was therefore in violation of the double
jeopardy clause.160 Following a reversal ordered by a three-judge panel from the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the entire court took up the issue de novo.161
151

324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2003).

152

Id. at 639.

153

255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2001).

154

324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2003).
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435 U.S. 313 (1978).
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495 U.S. 676 (1990).
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Enas, 255 F.3d 662, at 665.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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The tribes, stated the court, retain all sovereignty “which is not inconsistent with
their status as ‘conquered’ and ‘dependant’ nations.”162 In other words the
sovereignty they retain is only that which is “needed to control [the tribes’] own
internal relations, and to preserve their own unique customs and social order.”163
Congress, the court found, has the authority to grant or take away any and/or all of
this authority.164
The debate centered on whether this authority was inherent to the tribe. “Who
prevails,” asks the court, “when the dispute between court and Congress is neither
constitutional nor statutory, but a matter of common law based on history? After
all . . . Duro (as well as the cases upon which Duro relies) rests on its interpretation
of the historical attributes of tribal power.”165 Nowhere in Duro166 is there any
mention of constitutional implications, explained the court.167 It would be
“extraordinary,” explained the court, for Duro168 to be based on constitutional
principles without actually mentioning the Constitution.169 Additionally, the court
pointed to language in the legislative history of the “Duro Fix” which specifically
states that the statute was an affirmation of inherent tribal powers, and not a
delegation of them.170
The court found that the holding in Duro171 was in fact based on common law,
and “within the realm of federal common law—and the federal common law of
tribes—Congress is supreme.”172 And, as often seems the case, the Eighth Circuit
completely disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s holding, with a holding of its own in
Lara,173 which found that tribal jurisdiction over non-member Indians was a
delegated power not inherent.174 Interestingly, the United States Supreme Court
denied a hearing on appeal for the Enas175 case.
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2. United States v. Lara
Lara, like Enas, was a non-member Indian on another tribe’s reservation;176
specifically, the Spirit Lake Nation Reservation.177 Initially, Lara was arrested by
tribal police officers from the BIA and informed that he had been banned from the
reservation by tribal order, whereupon Lara punched one of the officers.178 Lara was
charged in tribal court of “violence to a policeman, resisting lawful arrest, public
intoxication, disobedience to a lawful order of the tribal court and trespassing.”179
Lara was sentenced to a total of 155 days after he pled guilty to the first three
charges.180 The federal government then instituted proceedings against Lara for
assault on a federal officer (the officer was part of the BIA), and Lara requested a
motion to dismiss, arguing, like Enas, that this was a violation of double jeopardy.181
The magistrate judge denied Lara’s motion, and Lara appealed to the Eighth
Circuit.182
Like the Ninth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit found that the threshold issue turned on
whether or not a tribe’s sovereignty in criminal jurisdiction over non-member
Indians was inherent, or delegated by Congress.183 Unlike the Ninth Circuit,
however, the Eighth Circuit held that rather than the issue being a federal common
law issue, “the distinction between a tribe’s inherent and delegated powers is of
constitutional magnitude and therefore is a matter ultimately entrusted to the
Supreme Court.184
Whatever jurisdiction tribes had, Congress took away from them, and what little
was returned, was done so under delegation through treaties or statutes.185 These
treaties and statutes, held the court, were done so under the authority given to
Congress by the Constitution, and were therefore, constitutionally delegated powers
rather than federal common law powers.186 Exercising criminal jurisdiction over
non-member Indians, the court explained, was an “external relation” which the
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Supreme Court had held in Duro,187 to have no longer existed in the tribes, and could
only be “fixed” through a delegation of Constitutional powers.188
Just like after the holding in Duro,189 however, the federal government came to
the rescue (an unimaginable sense of irony, the U.S. Congressional “Cavalry”
coming to the aid of the tribes). The United States Solicitor General, backed by the
Bush administration in its “urging the Supreme Court to affirm the inherent powers
of tribal governments,”190 took a very pro-tribal argument in arguing for Congress’
ability and authority to restore tribal sovereignty in criminal matters.
The Solicitor General’s Office, in its petition for writ of certiorari argued four
main reasons for granting the review of the Lara case: a) that the “Duro Fix”
legislation is a common law fix and not a constitutional fix, and therefore falls
squarely under the proper authority of Congress to legislate and correct; b) that the
Eighth and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals conflict with one another requiring a
uniform decision; c) that the Eighth Circuit greatly erred in attempting to “rewrite”
the intent of Congress in the “Duro Fix” legislation; d) that agreeing with the Eighth
Circuit would completely undermine what little authority tribal judiciaries have left
over criminal matters in Indian country.191
The Solicitor’s Petition also pointed to studies conducted by the Senate and
House which took place prior to the adoption of the “Duro Fix” amendment.192 The
reports pointed out that if the Duro decision were to be left “as is,” that a
jurisdictional void would be created in Indian country due to the fact that the federal
and state governments have little resources or little incentive to go after
misdemeanor crimes taking place in Indian country.193 Even in PL-280 states, where
the state does have jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country, the committees found
that they were unwilling to pursue misdemeanor defendants.194 Additionally, since
lesser-included offenses have also been deemed to fall under the auspices of the
double jeopardy clause, even the prosecution of the misdemeanor offenses in Tribal
courts would bar prosecution of the “greater-encompassing offenses.”195 Therefore,
the Solicitor General’s Office argued, non-member Indians would have a great
incentive to be tried and punished in tribal courts and thereby avoid any more serious
187
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federal prosecution and sentence.196 However correct the Solicitor’s arguments may
have been, the argument that a jurisdictional void would be created has fallen on deaf
Supreme Court ears before, and was merely brushed aside.197
As is often the case where two Federal Circuit Courts disagree on an issue, the
U.S. Supreme Court recently weighed in on the delegation vs. inherent powers
dilemma.198 Referring to the Constitution’s broad grant of power over Indian affairs
to Congress, the Court held that “Congress does possess the constitutional power to
lift the restrictions on the tribes’ criminal jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians . . . .”199 Congress used this power, held the Court, merely to relax
restrictions to the tribes’ inherent sovereignty to “control events that occur upon the
tribe’s own land.”200
This recent ruling by the Court could be interpreted very broadly to mean that
should Congress so desire, it could “relax” more restrictions on Indian sovereignty
by passing new legislation which could give tribes jurisdiction over anyone and
everyone. Certainly, should it so desire, it could grant jurisdiction to tribes over
foreign nationals as is being proposed in the Tribal Government Amendments to the
Homeland Security Act discussed above.
VI. CONCLUSION
Will the courts continue to erode at what little is left of tribal sovereignty over
criminal jurisdiction in Indian country, or will they begin to follow the trend now
found among their colleagues in Congress, to assist in the self-determination of the
tribes? It is clear that something must be done.
If the courts and Congress determine that the jurisdiction lies with the federal
government rather than the tribes, then they both need do something about the
spiraling rise in violent crime rates in Indian country. The best solution would be to
work with the tribes, either by giving back full/concurrent jurisdictional control over
criminal matters which take place in Indian country, or to find alternate solutions to
prevent this great injustice. With the revenue from gaming and other enterprises,
which is now finding its way to some of the tribes, it would behoove the federal
government to continue to work closely with these and other tribes to make sure
some of it is earmarked for the improvement of law enforcement and judicial
entities. Yet, what incentive do tribes have to make these improvements when they
continue to lack effective criminal jurisdiction over those who are committing the
majority of the crimes?
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